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Abstract
I analyze how an exogenous cost of entry in a risky asset market
a®ects two endogenous variables: the degree of market participation
and the price volatility. I show that di®erent entry costs generate dif-
ferent participation equilibria and multiplicity of equilibria arises for
some range of entry costs, but the new market entrants are always
more risk-averse than the rest of the participants. Every participation
equilibrium is associated with a certain volatility of the price of the
asset. Most importantly, I show that increased market participation
leads to increased asset price volatility, if the new entrants are su±-
ciently more risk-averse than the old participants. This is supported
by empirical evidence. (JEL: G12, D40, C70)
KEYWORDS: participation, volatility, risk-aversion, externalities
1 Motivation
Over the past years, the increase in the number and in the diversity of traders
has generated changes in ¯nancial asset markets and their price volatility.
¤I am grateful to Pierpaolo Benigno, Jean-Pierre Benoit, Raquel Bernal, Alberto Bisin,
Lorenzo Cappiello, George Comer, Diego Comin, Paolo Dudine, Jean-Baptiste Eslyn, Ester
Faia, Douglas Gale, Boyan Jovanovic, Ron Miller, Marco Pagano, Paolo Pasquariello,
Fabrizio Perri, Gideon Saar, Alex Shapiro, Paolo Siconol¯ and Bernard Yeung for helpful
comments and discussions. Any errors in the paper are only mine. Comments are welcome.
1Overall, stock market participation has increased consistently since after
the war. In particular, the increase has been dramatic in the eighties and
nineties.1 Since 1995, a large variety of new investors started purchasing
assets in ¯nancial markets worldwide especially through the Internet.2 The
improved accessibility and the signi¯cant decrease in transaction costs are
the main reasons for the increasing popularity of Internet trading. Thanks
to information technology and telecommunications improvements, the in-
formation on any given security can now be spread instantaneously and is
immediately and directly available to every interested consumer virtually for
free. As a result of this technological revolution, there is no doubt that
the cost of acquiring information on assets declined dramatically in the past
years.
Whereas in the past higher transaction and information costs kept certain
types of investors out of risky asset markets, nowadays the easier access has
driven new types of investors into ¯nancial markets. However, while there
seems to be a consensus that the lowering of the pecuniary (brokerage) and
non-pecuniary (information and setup) costs of participation has driven new
investor-types into asset markets, whether the e®ect of these new market
participants has increased or decreased the asset price volatility is a question
that still needs theoretical and empirical exploration.
2 Agenda and Main Results
The theoretical goal of this paper is to study the following questions:
1. If a lower entry cost implies necessarily a higher market participation.
2. Under what conditions does increased market participation increase or
decrease the asset price volatility.
1The number of shareowners in the United States increased by approximately 32 million
from 1989 to 1998, when it reached approximately 84 million individuals. In particular,
the fraction of families having direct ownership in publicly traded stocks rose to 19.2% in
1998 from 15.2% in 1995, according to the latest Survey of Consumer Finances (1998).
2From 1995 through mid-2000, investors opened 12.5 million on-line brokerage accounts,
as Barber and Odean document (JEP 2001). This number is projected to grow to more
than 42 million by 2003. By the end of the '90s, on-line trading accounted for nearly half of
all retail (non-institutional) investor trades. Shareowners with on-line brokerage accounts
trade more frequently than those without such accounts, they consequently account for a
disproprtionately large share of total trading.
2My aim is to correct the "conventional wisdom" according to which a
higher market participation should decrease volatility, because the demand
shocks of more participants average-out better. As Pagano (ReStud. 1989)
shows, this dampening of the price volatility is caused by the cancellation
of the independent demand shocks of the market participants due to a law
of large numbers e®ect. Allen & Gale (AER 1994) also show an analogous
result: that limited market participation generates excess price volatility
through liquidity trading. As other participant-types with liquidity shocks
uncorrelated with old participants' shocks enter the market, the price volatil-
ity is dampened due to this higher liquidity shock heterogeneity. In other
words, these two models, which are benchmarks of the endogenous partici-
pation literature, both show that more market participation decreases price
volatility. As I clarify in the next section, some empirical studies show the
latter result is counterfactual.
The result of this paper is the opposite of the results of Allen&Gale and
Pagano. I show that if the potential market participants have di®erent levels
of risk-aversion, more participation can increase volatility. That is, the simple
introduction of heterogeneity in risk-aversion is su±cient to invalidate the
conventional wisdom, namely, the law of large numbers volatility-reduction
result of Pagano and Allen&Gale. Note that, the more uncorrelated the
idiosyncratic demand shocks of the potential investors are, the stronger the
dampening of the price volatility as new participants enter the market. Even
in the extreme case in which the shocks are independent and the dampening
of the volatility is hence the highest, the volatility can increase due to a
stronger opposing e®ect that arises from the heterogeneity in risk-aversion.
My result of increased volatility with increased participation is missing (to
the best of my knowledge) from the related limited participation theoretical
literature. The main intuition behind this result is outlined in what follows.
I analyze the di®erent participation equilibria that arise as I lower the
cost of entry in the asset market. Di®erent participation equilibria imply dif-
ferent price volatilities, depending on what types of investors enter the asset
market. First, I ¯nd that the less risk-averse types enjoy a higher bene¯t
than the more risk-averse types from participating in a risky asset market.
The main reason for that is that the types with lower risk-aversion require
a lower compensation than the higher risk-aversion types for bearing the
risk of holding the asset, once they have entered the market. So, for any
given such compensation the low risk-aversion types have a higher incentive
to participate in the market. As a consequence, for a high cost of market
3participation, the types with low risk-aversion are the only types to enter
the market. For a low entry cost, also the more risk-averse types enter the
market. However for intermediate entry costs, there are multiple participa-
tion equilibria: depending on how the highly risk-averse types coordinate
themselves, they may or may not decide to join the less risk-averse types in
the market.
Second, I ¯nd that the less risk-averse types react more aggressively to
any °uctuation in the price, by buying low or selling high larger amounts of
the asset than the other types. Hence, if many types with low risk-aversion
are participating in the market, there is a strong pressure on the asset price
that pushes the price towards its benchmark value.3 In other words, the low
risk-aversion types tend to dampen the price °uctuations more than the other
types, by aggressively buying and bidding up the price if the price is below
the benchmark, and conversely. As market participation increases (lower
entry cost) and the more risk-averse types join the less risk-averse types in
the market, the less aggressive reaction to the price °uctuations of the new
participants tends to increase the asset price volatility. This increasing e®ect
is counterbalanced though by the, always present, mutual shock cancellation
e®ect that tends to reduce the price volatility (law of large numbers e®ect). If
the participant types di®er su±ciently in risk-aversion levels, the law of large
numbers e®ect is weaker than the risk-aversion e®ect and as a consequence
the price volatility increases.
2.1 Empirical Evidence
If on the one hand, my result, as I said, is missing from the limited par-
ticipation theoretical literature, on the other hand, my result is supported
by empirical evidence. Indeed, the conventional wisdom that increased par-
ticipation should decrease price volatility not only it is not robust to the
introduction of heterogeneity in risk-aversion as I show, but does not repro-
duce some empirical evidence either. In the charts in the appendix, I take the
monthly change in the price-earnings ratio of the S&P500 index and show
that its °uctuations have increased over time in the past 25 years. I also show
that the intra-day volatility of the S&P500 has increased in the nineties. Si-
multaneously, the stock market participation has consistently increased in
3In this model the benchmark price is equal to the expected return of the risky asset
minus the risk-premium.
4the last ¯ve decades and dramatically increased in the nineties. My model is
consistent with this empirical evidence that documents this increase in price
volatility.
Besides my suggestive empirical ¯ndings, the predictions of my model are
consistent with signi¯cant econometric studies on stock return volatility for
individual stocks. In a recent in°uential paper, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel
and Xu (JoF 2001) prove empirically that the "idiosyncratic" volatility of in-
dividual stocks has increased dramatically over the past three decades. That
is, controlling for the volatility of the whole stock market and of the indi-
vidual industrial sectors, the volatility of the stocks, taken individually, has
increased in the last thirty years. The authors claim that the causes of this
increased volatility remain unclear. My model o®ers a plausible explana-
tion for this increase in volatility that Campbell et al. document. Indeed,
the risky asset under consideration in my framework can be interpreted as a
single stock rather than the stock market as a whole.4
My other important result that the new market entrants are more risk-
averse than the old market participants is also suggested by the empirical
literature which documents the di®erences between stock holders and non-
stockholders. Most empirical papers on the determinants of stock ownership
¯nd that the probability of stockownership is increasing in wealth and self-
reported risk tolerance (see for instance Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Vissing-
Jorgensen (1998 & 2000) and Polkovnichenko (2000)). In general, more
wealth is associated with lower absolute risk-aversion, which is the measure
of risk-aversion I adopted in my model, as it is customary in the asset-pricing
literature. Therefore, the richer investors which are the ¯rst market partici-
pants according to every survey, are also the more risk-tolerant according to
the absolute measure of risk-aversion. The less wealthy, which according to
empirical evidence enter the market later (thanks to a lower entry cost), are
indeed the more risk-averse in absolute terms, as my model predicts. The
quantitative prediction of my model is that if the new market entrants are
at least twice more risk-averse than the rest of the participants, then the
price volatility increases with more participation, even if the demand shocks
are completely uncorrelated and therefore their impact on the asset-price is
maximally reduced with increased participation. Since I refer to the absolute
(not the relative) risk-aversion coe±cient, this di®erence in risk-aversion of
4Moreover, in the 1990s the volatility of the high-turnover stocks rose to nearly double
its highs from the previous three decades levels (Barber and Odean, JEP 2001).
5the participant-types is not a strong heterogeneity requirement at all. For
instance, assuming instead that the population is characterized by a constant
relative risk-aversion, as often is done in macroeconomic models and as seems
more realistic5, it is su±cient for the a participant to have half the wealth to
be twice more risk-averse in absolute terms, as my model needs. Indeed, the
large relative di®erences in the US wealth distribution generate the (same)
large relative di®erences in the absolute risk-tolerance of the population.
3 General Setup
I introduce a model of endogenous market participation. There are three
asset:
1. Risky Asset X with uncertain return x (only traded in the market
under consideration)
2. Cash w (or safe asset)
3. Private Asset e with uncertain return uj (non-marketable and peculiar
to the investor-j).
The private asset represents any return that an agent-j may have aside
from cash and the risky asset, e.g. human capital, real estate, or other non-
liquid assets.
My framework has three periods and entails two sequential decisions made
by investors: in the ¯rst period, an entry decision in a given asset market,
in the second period (only in the case of entry) a portfolio decision on how
much of the risky asset to buy. In the third period all uncertain returns are
realized.
Since the problem has two stages, I proceed solving backwards. First,
I solve the second stage. I ¯nd every investor's demand for the asset and
aggregate these demands taking as given the number of market participants,
which is derived later when I solve the ¯rst stage problem. Equating aggre-
gate demand to aggregate supply, I obtain the equilibrium price of the asset
and the indirect utility from entry of every market participant as a function
of the number of participants. Comparing the utility from entry minus the
5Empirical studies show that even the relative risk-aversion coe±cient is decreasing in













Timing of Decisions 
 
 
Shock Realization ?j  Choose Xj 
Only Hold Cash & Private Asset  
Figure 1:
entry cost to the utility of not entering, I obtain the entry condition which
determines the ¯rst stage entry decision. Finally, I look for the Nash equi-
libria of the entry game and ¯nd the equilibrium number of participants.
Di®erent equilibrium levels of participation imply di®erent volatilities of the
asset price, which was previously derived in the second stage.
3.1 Demand of Market Participants
There are two types of investors. For every type-i there is a total number Ni
of agents. The number of agents of type-i that participate in the asset market
is ni · Ni. The total number of market participants n = nA+nB is taken as
given (exogenous) for now and is derived later as a function of the entry cost,
when I solve backwards for the participation equilibrium. Ex-ante, that is,
before making their participation decision, all potential participants face the
same entry cost and may di®er only in their level of risk-aversion. I denote
type-A as the aggressive (low risk-aversion) type and type-B as the backward
(high risk-aversion) type.
A potential participant that decides to enter the risky asset market (mar-
7ket henceforth) chooses his demand schedule for the risky asset X (p) and
keeps the rest of his initial wealth in cash. If the investor decides not to enter
the market, he can only hold cash.6 The risky asset has a given distribution







If the price of the risky asset is p and the initial wealth of the investor is
w, the ¯nal wealth of the investor is:
wf = (w ¡ pX) + xX
I derive now the demand schedule for the market participant. If the
investor enters the market, he then chooses X to maximize a linear mean-
variance objective over ¯nal wealth:
Ui = ®iE (wf) ¡ ¯iV ar(wf)
The expectations are taken with respect to the distribution of ¯nal returns
only: the price is observed at the moment the agent buys the asset, once he
has entered the market. I assume ®i > 0 and ¯i > 0, to express how investors
like a high expected return on their wealth and dislike a high volatility. I
de¯ne the ratio ai ´
®i
¯i; which is the risk-tolerance (see Sharpe and Alexander
1990) and expresses the agent's trade-o® between return and risk. For a given
linear mean-variance objective, the bigger is this ratio the less risk-averse is
the agent.7 This implies that: aA > aB. The backward types-B are the more
risk-averse and the aggressive types-A are still risk-averse but they are closer
to risk-neutrality, because they have a higher trade-o® ratio between return
and risk than the types-B.
6Nothing would change in all the results of this paper if I introduced a safe asset with
a return of R > 1; rather than simply cash.
7The objective U and the terms "risk-tolerance" and "risk-aversion" are used in a Mean-
Variance framework (see Sharpe (1970) or Sharpe and Alexander (1990)). On the other
hand, assuming multivariate normal return distribution and exponential vNM utility, the
linear MV-objective U is consistent with the expected utility theorem and 2a¡1 is the
Arrow-Pratt measure of risk-aversion, which is constant, i.e. independent from the initial
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Figure 2: First, the B-types demand less of the risky asset for any given
price, because they are more risk-averse, that is, they require a higher risk-
premium. Second, the B-types react less aggressively to any price °uctuation
having on aggregate a less dampening impact on the °uctuation than the less
risk-averse A-types.











Note ¯rst that, the B-types demand less of the risky asset for any given
price, because they are more risk-averse, that is, they require a higher risk-
premium. Second, the B-types react less aggressively to any price °uctuation
(aggregate shock) having on aggregate a less dampening impact on the °uc-
tuation than the less risk-averse A-types.
8With this MV-objective the demand does not depend on the initial cash w or on the
initial endowment of the asset X0:
If borrowing constraints on cash are present, I assume that the investors have enouph
initial cash to demand their optimal amount X of the asset.
93.2 Demand Shocks
I introduce now some heterogeneity in the agents' demands. All agents be-
longing to the same type-i are identical ex-ante, that is, before the time when
the entry decision is made. Ex-post, that is, after the entry decision is made
and before the portfolio decision, all agents di®er in the realizations of their
demand-shocks ½j as follows.
I assume that all investors have an endowment e of a non-marketable
asset. Given that, the ¯nal wealth is:
w
j
f = (w ¡ pX) + xX + uje;
where uj is the return of this non-marketable asset for each agent-j. This
non-marketable asset represents any private business or alternative return
that an agent has aside from cash and from the risky asset. For any given
agent j, the return of the non-marketable asset has a correlation ½j with the
risky asset, that is in general di®erent across agents. Before entering the
market the agents do not know how their endowment of their private asset
is correlated with the risky asset: they have some information about how
these correlations are distributed (see below).9Since the market participants
choose to purchase an amount X
j
i of the asset to maximize the mean-variance
objective over the ¯nal wealth, the demand function is the following:
X
j








where Cov(x;uj) ´ ½j¾u¾x is the covariance between the personal asset
return uj with the risky asset return x. Agents have di®erent demands for
the same asset x; since they have di®erent needs to diversify away the risk
arising from their private asset. I assume that before entering the market









The prior distribution (not the ex-post realization value) of ½j is the in-
formation agents have before entering the market, i.e., when making their
entry decision. The value of ½j for every participant is realized (learned)
right before the agents make their portfolio decision, that is, after the every
10participant has payed the entry cost and learned how his personal asset is
correlated with the risky asset he wants to purchase. The more positively
correlated with the risky asset is the agent's personal asset, the less of the
risky asset the agent demands. Everything else being equal, the higher the
volatility of the returns of the asset ¾2
x, the less aggressively the agent's de-
mand reacts to any given shock realization ½j, because all the agents are risk
averse.
3.3 Equilibrium Price and Variance Analysis
The equilibrium price is obtained by aggregating the demands over all n =
nA + nB participants assumed to be the market. I assume a constant per-
investor supply of the risky asset X0
10. The demand-supply equilibrium
















n identi¯es the average risk-aversion that characterizes
the asset market and ¡e¾u
½n
¾x denotes the demand shock averaged over the
n participants, that conventionally has a negative sign in this setup. The
sample mean of the shocks ½n is realized after the entry is made but before
purchasing the asset.
10If I assume that a ¯rm supplies the amount of the asset to maximize its value:
V = [nX0(n)]E[p(n)];
then, the optimal per-investor supply X0 of the asset is constant, that is, it does not






An elastic supply of the asset is custumary in the endogenous participation litterature,
because with a ¯xed supply, entry by additional investors would permanently increase
the market price and lower the expected rate of return. All the positive externalities
form entry that endogenous market participation wants to analyze would be o®set by this
increase of the market price. For this reason, Pagano (ReStud. 1989) assumes an elastic
supply of equities by introducing-value maximizing ¯rms and Allen & Gale (AER 1994)
assume a perfectly elasti supply (p = 1) of the asset in the ¯rst period.












I call the expected price the benchmark price:




The benchmark price is an increasing function of the expected return and a
decreasing function of the variance of returns. The term ¡2X0
an ¾2
x expresses
the risk-premium, i.e., the compensation in terms of price that the market
participants require for the risk they are bearing when purchasing the risky
asset. The bigger this variance ¾2
x the less the agents will demand of the risky
asset. The reduction in demand leads to a higher compensation and a lower
equilibrium price. As intuition suggests, the decline in price is stronger the
higher the average risk-aversion of the agents that participate in the market
(the smaller the coe±cient an).
For a ¯xed per-agent supply X0, the demand-shock term alone is respon-












The ¯rst factor expresses the standard law of large numbers result: with in-
dependent shocks, as more agents enter the market the variance of the price
is reduced due to mutual shock cancellation. The second factor expresses the
negative dependence of the variance of the price on the average risk-tolerance
an of the market: A higher average an means that there are relatively many
type-A agents in the market. These investors with low risk-aversion react
more aggressively to the variations in price due to idiosyncratic or aggregate
shocks, because they have a more elastic demand. Hence they have on ag-
gregate a stronger stabilizing e®ect on the equilibrium price and therefore
reduce its variance. This can be seen easily if you imagine one agent that
has no demand shocks (½j = 0 always), so that he only contributes to reduce
the price volatility by pushing the price back to target, without contributing
to increment it with his shock. This push is stronger the lower the risk-
aversion. In the limit if the agent is extremely aggressive, i.e. risk-neutral
12(ai = 1), his demand is perfectly elastic, the price is pinned to the expected
return (p = ¹x) and the price volatility is reduced to zero as well as the risk-
premium. In this extreme case, with no borrowing or short sales constraints,
the presence of a single risk-neutral participant is su±cient to eliminate all
uncertainty in the price. If the shock is present, by looking at the individual
demands you can see that its magnitude does not depend on the level of
risk-aversion, so all types make the same positive contribution to the price
volatility.11The third factor says that the variance of the demand shocks of
the agents that enter the market is passed on to the variance of the price.
This happens because more volatile individual demands make the aggregate
demand more volatile and the asset supply is constant in this model. Lastly,
not surprisingly the price volatility depends positively on the variance of the
returns ¾2
x: A high variance ¾2
x translates into a high covariance ¾xu of the re-
turns of the risky asset x with the returns of the private asset u: Hence, since
this covariance is the source of the demand shocks of the participants, a high
¾2
x generates signi¯cant °uctuations in the aggregate demand, that trans-
late into signi¯cant °uctuations in the equilibrium price since the supply is
constant.

















As ¯gure 2 shows, the more risk-tolerant A-types demand on average more
than the per agent supply and push more aggressively than the types-B in the
direction opposite to the aggregate shock, mitigating more the price volatility.
The contribution of a single agent to the price volatility ¡e¾u
½j
¾x is the same
across types though.
Now that it is clear what is the relation between participation (nA;nB)
and volatility Var(p), it is left to ¯nd the relation between entry cost C and
participation, which is done in the following sections. It is clear that to
some extent a lower entry cost implies a higher market participation. But
to determine the volatility implications of an increased market participation,
it is crucial to know who are the new market entrants, i.e., how they are
distributed across risk-aversion levels with respect to the rest of the market
participants.
133.4 Utility from Market Participation
All agents of a given type are identical ex-ante, namely, before entering the
market. The heterogeneity within a given type arises only ex-post, namely
before the portfolio choice and after the participation decision, when the i.i.d.
distributed correlations ½j of the non-marketable assets with the risky asset
are realized.
The utility for a given type depends on how many agents of both types
enter the market, that is:
















The intuition for the last expectation term is simple if you assume no
heterogeneity in risk-aversion (
ai
an = 1). The more distant the agent-j is from
the sample mean shock the better-o® he is, since he can better exploit the
market through speculation. The "diversity" of one investor with respect to
the rest of the market generates his possibilities of speculation. More impor-
tantly, the speculative value of the asset market increases with the number
of participants n: Suppose that the investor-j has a high realization of ½j; in
a thin market this realization increases signi¯cantly the entire sample mean
½n. If the market is not thin, i.e. there are many independent investors in
the market, one shock realization does not in°uence signi¯cantly the sample
mean. In terms of equilibrium price the same concept can also be stated
in the following way. In a thin market the demand shock of a single agent
generates a signi¯cant price movement. This price movement is adverse to
the agent, that is, it reduces his utility from speculation. In a market with
many participants the price is not in°uenced signi¯cantly by a single agent's
demand, so there are no adverse price movements that reduce speculative
pro¯ts.






























The four terms in this expression have an important economic interpretation,
which I give when I study the participation condition. The assumption that





; makes the potential participants
di®er ex-ante only in the level of their risk-aversion and allows to analyze the
e®ects on participation and volatility of risk-aversion heterogeneity alone.




























To simplify notation, for the rest of the paper I de¯ne: ¾ ´ e¾ub ¾:
4 Participation Analysis
Now that the second stage of the problem is solved, in the remaining sec-
tions I solve the ¯rst stage problem. I ¯nd the (Nash-)equilibrium level of
market participation (nA;nB) for any given entry cost. To each equilibrium
corresponds a certain level of the variance of the price of the asset.
4.1 Participation Condition
If an agent decides to stay out of the market, he cannot buy the risky asset:
X
j
i = 0, so he can only keep in his portfolio his initial cash (or the safe asset)
and his personal asset. Hence his ¯nal wealth is:
w
o
f = w + uje
His expected utility from staying out is:
E (U
o
i ) = [®iw ¡ ¯iVar(uje)]
Every agent faces a utility cost C0 when entering the market. Agent-i par-
ticipates in the market if:
E (Ui)(nA;nB) ¡ C
0 > E (U
o
i )





















































15Vi (nA;nB) depends on the risk-aversion ratios a = ®
¯: The fact that the
RHS above does depend on the level of ¯i is just a matter of scaling. If we
double ® and ¯ the a-ratio along with the LHS remains constant. However,
the mean-variance objective function doubles, or equivalently, the utility cost
of participation is halved relative to the bene¯t of participation. To make a
fair comparison among the utilities of types with di®erent risk-aversion ratios
ai, I normalize: ¯i = 1 for every type, or equivalently consider the quantity:
C ´ C0
¯i to be constant across types. This guarantees that, everything else
being equal, agents with the same risk-aversion coe±cient ai face the same
participation condition.12Allowing the quantity C0
¯i to vary across types is
equivalent in this model, de facto, to allowing heterogeneity of entry costs.
The following gives the economic intuition behind the terms in Vi (nA;nB):
The term proportional to ¾2
x represents the risk-premium compensation
in utility terms. The more risk-averse the market is (an low), the higher
the compensation for every agent-type. In this sense, agents with high risk-
aversion are always welcome into a market with lower average risk-aversion,
because they exercise a positive externality on all participants, by increasing
the average risk-aversion and the risk-premium. An aggressive type-A, i.e., a
low risk-aversion agent (ai big), requires a lower risk-premium compensation
than the more risk-averse agents. Hence, an A-type is better-o® than a B-




agents feel more rewarded than the type-B agents.13
The higher the expected \diversity" ¾2 of the agent, the higher his chances
of ¯nding the asset at a market price that is very convenient to him, taking
into account his idiosyncratic risk-hedging needs. Obviously, this bene¯t is
absent if only one agent is in the market, because the adverse movement of
the price o®sets one to one his demand shock.
The variance of the equilibrium price always enters positively in the utility
from entry. This is the \speculative value" of market participation: a high
price volatility raises welfare because it increases the chances of buying low
or (short-)selling high. Everything else being equal, a high price volatility
encourages market participation. For a given price volatility, the more risk-
loving type-A agents (ai big) react more aggressively to every °uctuation
13Note that this last result does not rely at all on the fact that this risk-premium term
depends positively on the variance of the returns ¾2
x, which is a peculiar feature of the
linear MV-objective adopted. This crucial result would be unchanged if the risk-premium
term depended negatively on ¾2
x:
16of the price, because their demand function is more price-elastic than the
types-B. This results in a higher bene¯t for the types-A from participating
in this market. Price volatility is endogenous here though. Since for now the
demand shocks are assumed to be i.i.d., the price volatility declines as more
agents enter the market, reducing the speculative value of the market and
discouraging participation.




n comes directly from the correlation of the sin-
gle demand shock with the average shock ½n. This represents the adverse
price movement caused by the demand of the agent under consideration.
Since ceteris paribus the more risk-loving type opposes ½n more aggressively
than any agent of the other type, he is responsible for a stronger price move-
ment in that direction (opposing ½n), which more often than not is an adverse
direction for him because his shock ½i is a component of the average shock ½n.
This e®ect discourages entrance but vanishes for n large: since the demand
shocks are independent, this negative term declines in a thicker market due
to the law of large numbers shock-cancellation. If there are only agents of
one type in the market, the comparison between the two e®ects of points 3
and 4 is straightforward: the negative e®ect of the adverse price movement is
stronger than the positive e®ect of price speculation. Since these terms are













In the particular case in which there is only one type of agents in the
market, entrance by an additional agent generates a positive externality an
all participants by making the market less thin, that is, by reducing the
adverse price movement that each individual demand generates. In this case,
it is true that \the more, the merrier": the more investors enter the market
the higher the bene¯t of all the market participants.
4.2 Participation Equilibria
In this section I ¯nd the Nash equilibria of this entry game with (NA + NB)
players, i.e. ,all the potential market participants. For a given entry cost C;
(nA;nB)²(0;NA) £ (0;NB) is an (interior) equilibrium if and only if:
VA (nA;nB) ¸ C ¸ VA (nA + 1;nB)
VB (nA;nB) ¸ C ¸ VB (nA;nB + 1);
17so that investors already in the market weakly prefer to stay in and an
additional investor of every type weakly prefers not to enter. This implies
that a necessary condition to have an interior equilibrium is that the functions
Vi(ni;¢) are both non-increasing for some common range of values. Total
participation of agents of type-B (nA;NB) is an equilibrium only if:
VB (nA;NB) ¸ C
No participation of type-2 of agents: (nA;0) is an equilibrium only if:
VB (nA;1) · C
and similarly for type-A agents. In the picture below, I show how di®erent
participation equilibria arise for a given entry cost C: In the picture I as-
sume, for mere illustrative purposes, that there is only one type of agents:
I denote by n · N the number of investors that participate in the market
and by N the total number of investors. It is clear from the picture that for
any entry cost C, an interior equilibrium, such as Eq.2, exists only if the
value function V (n) is decreasing for some range of values of n: If the value
function is strictly increasing, then for any entry cost, the only two possible
participation equilibria are the no-participation equilibrium (Eq.1) and the
full participation equilibrium (Eq.3).
Since in the model, there are two types of agents ¯nding the participation
equilibria involves studying the value function of both types simultaneously.
Before ¯nding the equilibria of this game, I assume that NA and NB are
large, that is, the total number of agents of any type is large. This means
that if all the agents of any given type decide to enter the market, then there
are many investors in the market, i.e. the market is not thin.14
Lemma 1 For every nA; VB (nA;nB) is strictly increasing in nB:
Proof. See appendix.
The above lemma extends \the more, the merrier" result to the backward
types: no matter how many type-A agents are in the market, if a type-B
14Of course, if many agents of a given type decide not to participate (ni < Ni), the
market can be thin. However as it turns out, a number of participants ni; such that
0 < ni < Ni, never corresponds to a participation equilibrium in this model.
For the purpose of this model Ni need not be too large. It is su±cient Ni large enough,
so that in the Vi functions the terms proportional to ¾2
n are negligible with respect to the











































19investors decides to participate, all the type-B participants are better-o®.
Indeed, the entrance of a B-type is a positive externality for all the other
participants regardless of their type. Since the value function for the B-types
is always increasing, in equilibrium the agents of type-B enter the market
only as a whole group. Since NB is large, the terms proportional to 1
n become
negligible with respect to the other terms. Hence:

















Lemma 2 For every (nA;nB) such that n is large enough, VA(nA + 1;nB) >
VB (nA;nB)
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3 For any entry cost C, there are only three possible partic-
ipation equilibria: no participation (nA;nB) = (0;0), partial participation
(nA;nB) = (NA;0) and total participation (nA;nB) = (NA;NB).
Proof. See appendix.
All possible (that is, not considering the level of the entry cost) partici-
pation Nash-Equilibria are represented as the black dots on the graph below.
The important result is that no equilibrium lies inside the rectangle, namely,
agent types enter the market only as a whole group.
The vertical arrows represent the fact that for any number of A-participants,
the entrance of a B-type makes all the B-participants better-o®. Hence, the
types with higher risk-aversion enter in blocks (this is true for any number
of types). This positive participation externality arising from the entry of
B-types has two origins. First, the entry of an additional B-investor it gen-
erates a thicker market, improving the participants' welfare. Namely, the
demand of every single participant has a smaller e®ect on the equilibrium
price, that is, the adverse price movements generated by the demand of any
participant is reduced. Second, it increases the average risk-aversion of the
market participants, generating a higher risk-premium and a lower price. For
the same reason, the entrance of an A-type generates a negative externality
on all participants by decreasing the average risk-aversion and a positive ex-
ternality by making the market thicker. However, if there are only agents of
one type in the market this risk-premium externality is absent because the
20Participation Nash-Equilibria
 nB   (Full Participation)
NB                                        
          (NA,NB)
nA
0    (NA,0)
(No Participation) (Limited Participation)
Figure 5:
average risk-aversion remains unchanged as an additional agent enters. In
this case the positive the thicker market externality becomes predominant.
The horizontal arrow represents the fact that if there are only A-types in the
market, the entry of an additional A-type generates a positive externality
on all participants by making the market less thin. Hence, if there are only
A-types in the market, then an additional A-type increases the utility of all
participants.
For any given entry cost C, some of the three possible Nash-equilibria
exist. The following proposition give the necessary and su±cient conditions
for the existence of each of the three possible participation equilibria.
Proposition 4 No participation is an equilibrium if and only if the entry
cost is above a minimum level: C ¸ X2
0¾2
x: Full participation is an equilibrium
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For given parameter values some of the three participation equilibria coexist,
that is, multiple equilibria arise for some range of entry costs, as this ¯gure
shows:
I call the no-participation equilibrium the trivial equilibrium. For some
range of entry costs, the trivial equilibrium can coexist with either (see foot-
note) or both the partial and the full participation equilibria. When there
are multiple equilibria, if the trivial equilibrium is selected, then it means
that a potential asset market is missing due to coordination failure.15 The
following result expresses what the picture illustrates.























15In the picture above the location of the no-participation equilibrium relative to the














x + ¾2, but the lower bound for
the no-participation equilibrium (k2¾2
x) can also be located below the lower bound for







x + ¾2) or above the upper







x + ¾2 ). The location
of the partial participation equilibrium relative to the full participation equilibrium is
independent though from the parameter values.







x + ¾2 <
C · X2
0¾2
x + ¾2 partial participation is the unique (non-trivial) equilibrium.
For C > X2
0¾2
x + ¾2 nobody participates in the market (trivial equilibrium).
In the case of multiple equilibria, the di®erent participation equilibria can
always be Pareto-ranked. The partial participation equilibrium is Pareto-
superior to the no-participation equilibrium, because the B-types have a
higher welfare from participating than not. The full participation equilib-
rium is Pareto-superior to the other two equilibria for the following reason.
On the one hand, in a full participation equilibrium the B-types have a
higher welfare from participating then if they were the only types in the
market, since they receive a higher risk-premium compensation due to the
participation of the A-types. The A-types also have a higher welfare in a
full participation equilibrium than in a no-participation equilibrium. On the
other hand, the B-types have a higher welfare from participating (full par-
ticipation equilibrium) than not entering (partial participation equilibrium
or no-participation equilibrium). Indeed in the case of multiplicity of equi-
libria, the failure to enter the market of one type of investors (as a whole) is
a coordination failure that locks the market into a lower participation-lower
welfare equilibrium.
All these results on market participation can be generalized to more
types/levels of risk-aversion (A;B;C;:::;Z). Assuming to rank them in order
of increasing risk-aversion, the following result holds.
Proposition 6 All the possible participation equilibria for many types are of
the form: (0;0;0:;:::;0); (NA;0;0:;:::;0); (NA;NB;0:;:::;0); (NA;NB;NC;:::;0):etc.
So types inter in blocks. The intuition is that the types (say Z-types)
with the highest risk-aversion enter in blocks because their utility is strictly
increasing. For a given entry cost, if the Z-types enter, then all the other less
risk-averse types want to enter as well, because they have a higher bene¯t
in terms of risk-premium. If Z-types do not enter, then the above argument
applies to the second more risk-averse Y -types, which, in turn, now become
the more risk-averse potential participants. The process unravels this way
by induction. The multiplicity of equilibria, their dependance on the entry
cost and the Pareto ranking are qualitatively the same as in the two types
case.
234.4 Equilibrium Volatility
The volatility of the price of the asset depends on the particular participation
equilibrium selected. An important result of this paper is that the price
volatility can increase as the types-B agents enter the market and the market
moves from a partial participation to a full participation equilibrium. That
is a thicker market can be more volatile than a thinner market. In the partial














In the full participation equilibrium the price volatility is:
Varf (p) =
1




























is the ratio of the risk-tolerance, or its inverse ±
¡1 is the ratio of the risk-
aversion of the two participant-types.
Proposition 7 Volatility increases with more participation only if the new




24Proof. The variance-ratio is grater than 1 for every z in the interval:
0 < z < z1 ´ 1¡2±
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z
The continuous line shows the e®ect on volatility for ± = 0:3:
The dotted line shows the steady decrease in volatility due to the Law of
Large Numbers e®ect only, that is, ± = 1 (no risk-aversion heterogeneity).
As the market shifts from a partial participation to a full participation
equilibrium and the type-B agents enter the market, two e®ects push the
price volatility in opposite directions. One e®ect is due to the law of large
numbers: additional market participants reduce the price volatility because
their demand shocks tend to average-out better. The cross-line in the ¯g-
ure shows the steady decrease in volatility due to this e®ect alone, that is,
without risk-aversion heterogeneity. The other e®ect is the risk-aversion ef-
fect that tends to increase volatility: the highly risk-averse B-agents react
less aggressively to any price movement, contributing less than the more
25risk-loving A-types to the dampening of the price °uctuations. Which of the
two e®ects dominates depends on how di®erent the two participant-types are
in their risk-aversion levels and on the proportion z of new participants. If
the new entrants are enough more risk-averse than the other market partici-
pants, then the e®ect of more participation in an asset market is an increase
in the price volatility. However, if the relative number of new participants is
very large the variance-ratio decreases and drops below one, no matter how
risk-averse the new participants are. This is intuitive. Eventually, if the new
participants dominate the market, that is, the old participants are negligible
with respect to the new participants (high z), then the average risk-aversion
of the market is almost constant. Since the law of large numbers e®ect is the
only e®ect in a market with homogenous risk-aversion, volatility decreases
sharply for high values of z.
It should be clear that the assumption of independent shocks is an extreme
case. In general, the demand shocks are not completely independent across
agents, that is, there is some degree of correlation among the demand-shocks.
A systematic component in the agent's shocks is equivalent to an aggregate
shock. In the presence of aggregate shocks, the mutual shock cancellation is












The term in square parentesis, which is the LLN cancellation term, decreases
at a slower pace and does not coverge to zero anymore, but to ° > 0: With
full correlation (° = ¾2) the shock cancellation is totally absent. As a con-
sequence of this only partial shock cancellation, a smaller di®erence in risk-
aversion among the market participants is su±cient to increase the price
volatility.
5 Extension: OLG Model
In this section I consider a dynamic version of the original static model and
show that my results still hold. I assume that on every period one cohort of
participants enters the market purchasing the risky asset inelastically sup-
plied by the previous cohort that entered the market one period before. So,
26the last period in the static model now becomes the period at which the mar-
ket participants sell inelastically (and then exit the market) all their risky
asset holdings to a new generation of participants that enters the market in
that period. As a consequence, a unit of the asset now has the exogenous
risky return x as before, and, if it was purchased at a price pt, it also has a
return pt+1 from its sale price. The relevance of this extension comes from
the fact that in the static model investors liked the price volatility because it
merely had a speculative value, namely, it enhanced their chances of specu-
lation. In the dynamic extension the buyers of today are sellers tomorrow, so
they like volatility today but dislike it tomorrow, since it generates variability
in their ¯nal wealth. I analyze only steady-state participation Nash-equilibria
of this model. I assume that the total per agent supply of the asset in the
market is constant X0: The ¯nal wealth of investor-j is:
w
j
f = R(w ¡ ptX) + (pt+1 + x)X + uje;
where R is the return of the safe asset (e.g. cash if R = 1).
Avoiding all the derivations (see appendix), the investors of type-i enter













































The variance of the future price is now liked because it generates a higher risk-
premium (¯rst term) and disliked because it a®ects positively the volatility
of the ¯nal wealth when selling the asset (second term). The variance of the






n : It enters
positively in the utility from entry because it enhances the chances of price
speculation when purchasing the asset.
The participation equilibria of the dynamic model are the same as in
static model and the same pattern of multiple equilibria arises as the entry
cost changes (see appendix). Since the expression of the price volatility
27is the same as in the basic model, the volatilities that correspond to the
di®erent participation levels are also the same as in the static model. So the
dynamic extension adds nothing new to the basic model, but allows another
interpretation of the results on volatility, as follows.
5.1 Volatility of Returns
The dynamic extension is important because, the results on the price volatil-
ity easily translate into return volatility. Returns are so de¯ned:
rt+1 = log(pt+1 + xt+1) ¡ logpt
Since in my model, the price is i.i.d. distributed in every period t, a higher
range of °uctuation in the price implies a higher range of °uctuation in the
returns. If, more precisely, I take the variance as the measure of volatility
instead of the range of °uctuation, I can show that.
Proposition 8 A higher variance of the price implies a higher variance of
the returns of the asset.
Proof. See appendix
Summarizing, when I say that more participation increases volatility, I
refer to both price and return volatility, the latter is what matters more and
is studied in the empirical literature.
6 Summary
I have answered the two questions I outlined in the introduction.
First, this model replicates the stylized fact that the lowering of the en-
try costs drives more agent-types into the asset markets in the following way.
As the entry cost is lowered, the market moves from a participation equi-
librium in which only the more risk-tolerant types-A are in the market, to
a multiple equilibrium situation in which also the more risk-averse types-B
can participate in the market. As the entry cost is lowered further all types
necessarily enter the market regardless of their risk-aversion. The backward
types-B require a higher compensation than the aggressive types-A for the
risk they are bearing when purchasing the risky asset. Hence, for any given
number of participants (nA;nB), the types-A perceive a higher risk-premium
28compensation in utility terms than the types-B. This is a reason why the
aggressive types enjoy a higher bene¯t from participating and have a higher
incentive to enter the market than the backward types.16 As a consequence
for some range of entry costs, the A-types are better-o® participating in the
market and the B-types are better-o® staying out of the market.
Second, the more risk-tolerant agents react more aggressively to any price
°uctuation, by buying less (or more) of the asset in larger amounts than
the other types in response to any given price shock. Hence, as market
participation increases and the more risk-averse types join the less risk-averse
types in the market, the less aggressive reaction to the price °uctuations of
the new participants tends to increase the asset price volatility. The increase
in volatility is more likely the more risk-averse the new participants are and
it is more pronounced in the presence of aggregate price shocks, that is, if
the demand shocks of the participants are correlated.
16This becomes the compelling reason when the market is thick, that is, when the terms
other than the risk-premium (i.e. the terms proportional to 1
n) in the entry condition
become negligible with respect to the risk-premium compensation term.
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7.1 Proofs







x is increasing in nB: Since:
aB










n is always negative, vanishes for big n and its ¯rst derivative
with respect to nB is always positive. Hence, VB (nA;nB) is always strictly
increasing in nB:
Proof. 2 Since the terms proportional to 1=n are negligible with respect






























< n + 1;
which is trivially satis¯ed.
Proof. 3 Since VB (nA;nB) is strictly increasing in nB; the only possible
values of nB compatible with equilibria are nB = 0 and nB = NB: First, I look




is strictly increasing in nA (if only agents of one type enter the market \the
more, the merrier" result holds). Hence, the only equilibria with nB = 0
are (nA;nB) = (0;0) and (nA;nB) = (NA;0): Second, I look for the possible
equilibria with nB = NB: In order for (n¤
A;NB) to be an equilibrium for any
given n¤
A, it must be the case that: VB (n¤
A;NB) ¸ C: Since NB is large









In other words, the additional agent of type-A strictly prefers to partici-
pate at the entry cost C, meaning that (n¤
A;NB) with n¤
A < NA cannot
be an equilibrium. Hence, the only possible equilibrium with nB = NB is
(nA;nB) = (NA;NB):
Proof. 4 Since VA(1;0) = VB (0;1) = X2
0¾2
x, every agent prefers not
to enter the empty market if and only if X2
0¾2










; every agent prefers not to exit the full























x + ¾2; given that all agents
of type-A are participating in the market and no agent of type-B is partici-
pating (nA;nB) = (NA;0), a type-B agents prefers to stay out of the market







x + ¾2 and type-A agent prefers to stay in the
market if and only if C · X2
0¾2
x + ¾2:
Proof. 8 By taking a ¯rst order approximation of the log around the
mean17 and recalling that the random variable return is independent from
the random variable price, I obtain:















The benchmark price E(p) has decreased with more participation because
of the higher risk-premium, required by the more risk-averse new entrants.
Hence, moving from a partial participation equilibrium to a full participation
equilibrium, the variance of the log-price increases if the variance of the price
increases. Remembering that the covariance of functions of stochastically
















So the variance of the returns increases with the variance of the price.
17This approximation is accurate if the price (and dividend x) °uctuations are small
relative to the mean price level:
¢p
p ¿ 1. This is typically the case, since it is the





















317.2 OLG Model Calculations
I present here all the derivations for the extended model. The derivations
for the static model can be obtained from the extended model by setting
pt+1 = 0:
I restate now the following de¯nitions.
The ¯nal wealth of investor-j is:
w
j








is the risky asset's return (e.g. a dividend for a stock) which is distributed
with known mean and variance, whereas R is the return of the safe asset (e.g.









This private asset denotes any return that an investor may have aside from
the risky asset x under consideration and the safe asset. Before entering the
market the every potential participant knows how these assets are distributed
but does not know how his private asset uj is correlated with the risky asset
x:





that is, before entering the market the potential participant only knows that
this correlation is zero on average but could be positive or negative with
a variance of b ¾
2: To enter the market investor-j pays an entry cost and
becomes informed of this correlation, that is, he obtains a realization of the
random variable ½j. So, after entering the market every participant knows
how his private asset is correlated with the risky asset and based on this
information he formulates his optimal demand for the latter. To obtain the
optimal demand, I must maximize the mean-variance objective, so I evaluate















2Vart(pt+1 + x) + e
2¾
2
u + 2eXCovt(pt+1 + x;uj)















to X, I obtain the FOC:
®i [Et (pt+1) + ¹x ¡ Rpt] ¡ ¯i [2XVart(pt+1 + x) + 2eCovt(pt+1 + x;uj)] = 0
Demand at time t:
X
j
i (pt) = ai
Et(pt+1) + ¹x ¡ Rpt
2Vart(pt+1 + x)
¡
eCovt (pt+1 + x;uj)
Vart(pt+1 + x)
= ai
Et(pt+1) + ¹x ¡ Rpt
2(Vart (pt+1) + ¾2
x)
¡ e
Covt (pt+1;uj) + Covt(x;uj)
Vart (pt+1) + ¾2
x
= ai
Et(pt+1) + ¹x ¡ Rpt







Et(pt+1) + ¹x ¡ Rpt






The last steps have the following justi¯cation. Since pt+1 is the price at which
the next cohort of investors is buying the asset from the current cohort which
is selling all the assets inelastically, pt+1 depends on the demand shocks of
the next cohort only. That is, pt+1 is not correlated with the returns x and
uj of the current generation's agents:
Covt(pt+1;uj) = 0
Covt(pt+1;x) = 0
Given that the total supply is (nA + nB)X0, the demand-supply equilib-
rium is:
X0 = an








where ½n;t is the sample average correlation of the time t-participants's private






























































Hence, the variance of the price is constant over time and it is the same as
the one found in the two period static model. Since on every period the
world looks the same in expectations, then for every t:












So, from now on I can omit the time subscripts on the expectation and
the variance of the price, since these quantities do not depend on time but
only on the number of participants of each type, that is on the particular










































































































































Having calculated the equilibrium demand of every participant, I can now


































































i ´ [®i (Rw + ¹ue) ¡ ¯ie2¾2
u] is the utility from not en-







, the expectation of
which is a crucial magnitude. I can substitute the demand schedule:
X
j
i (pt) = ai


































































































so that the entry condition becomes:
Vi ¡ C > 0


















































































I de¯ne the variable: ¾2 ´ e2¾2
ub ¾
2 to simplify the notation. The investors of











































































36The variance of the future price is now liked because it generates a higher risk-
premium (¯rst term) and disliked because it a®ects positively the volatility
of the ¯nal wealth when selling the asset (second term). The variance of








enters positively in the utility from entry because it enhances the chances of
price speculation when purchasing the asset.
7.3 Participation Nash-Equilibria in Steady-State
In any period there is a participation game among the potential participants
of that period. In every period there is a participation Nash-equilibrium.
I look for a steady-state participation equilibrium, that is, a sequence of
Nash-equilibria, where the same equilibrium distribution of participants enter
in every period. This task seems hard, because the number (distribution)
of participants in a given period in°uence the utility from entering of the
participants in the previous period, since the purchasing price of the asset
for one cohort is the selling price of the asset for the previous cohort. Note the
following. The market participants in any period take as given exogenously
the variance of the returns to their investment: ¾2
r ´Var(p) + ¾2
x; so the
Nash-equilibria for participation in any given period are the same as in the
static model. In mathematical terms, the only di®erence is that I am calling
¾2
r the variance of the returns instead of simply ¾2
x. Therefore as in the static
model, the only possible equilibria are no participation, full participation and
partial participation. There is still block-entry of participants in classes of
increasing risk-aversion. There are only three possible steady-states: the no
participation steady-state, the partial participation and the full participation.
The (possibly simultaneous) existence of these equilibria depends on the entry
cost C:
Proposition 9 No participation is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if
the entry cost is high enough: C ¸ X2
0¾2
x
Proposition 10 Full participation is a steady-state equilibrium if and only
if the entry cost is low enough:
37Proof.





























Proposition 11 Partial participation is a steady-state equilibrium if and
only if the cost lies in an intermediate range: VB (NA;1) · C · VA(NA;0):
Proof.










































7.4 Multiple Steady-State Equilibria
Full participation and partial participation coexist for every entry cost that

































Varp (p) + ¾2
x
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Summarizing, nothing changes qualitatively in the dynamic extension of




































































Figure 7: The P-E Ratio of the S&P500 shows increasing dispersion in the
past 25 year period.
8 Charts
Here are the charts I refer to in the introduction:







































Figure 8: The intra-day volatility, i.e. the maximum daily °uctuation of the
S&P500 trends upwards in the nineties.
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